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Jurisdiction of Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court as Appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated (1987,
as amended), (hereinafter U.C.A.).
Nature of Proceeding
This is an appeal in a domestic relations case from a
final Court Order of the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for
Utah County, State of Utah, which order denied Appellant Bevan
Bowles' Petition for Modification of a Decree of Divorce.
Statement of Issues
The issues presented on appeal are as follows:
1.

Whether the trial court erred in finding no change

of circumstances based upon Mr. Bowies' involuntary lay off from
his employment at Signetics Company in September, 1989.

1

2.
findings

of

Whether the trial court made sufficient or accurate
fact upon which

to base

its Order

denying

any

adjustment to Mr. Bowies' level of child support.
3.

Whether the Court erred in failing to consider the

evidence presented by Mr. Bowles showing his efforts to find
employment and in taking "judicial notice" of disputed factual
matters outside of the record.
4.

Whether the Court erred in its application of the

child support guidelines at U.C.A. §78-45-7.5(7) where the Court
imputed income to Mr. Bowles at the level of his most recent past
employment from which he was involuntarily laid off rather than
relying on Mr. Bowies' evidence of his actual earnings or his
evidence of historical earnings.
Determinative Constitutional Provisions and Statutes
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended at the following
sections:
a.

§78-45-7 (Child Support Guidelines);

b.

§78-45-7.5

(Determination

of Gross Income,

Imputed Income);
c.

§30-3-5 (Continuing jurisdiction of the Court

to modify support orders).

2

Statement of the Case
This an appeal from a final Court Order on a Petition for
Modification in a domestic relations case issued by Judge Cullen Y.
Christensen of the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah
County, State of Utah.

The Defendant/Appellant Bevan Bowles had

filed a Petition for Modification seeking to modify the parties'
Decree of Divorce

which was issued three years earlier.

Mr.

Bowles sought an adjustment to his child support obligation based
on his involuntary lay off from employment, as well as a court
review of issues of visitation and tax exemptions.

A hearing was

held on June 20, 1990, where only the parties were witnesses and
the Court ruled that Mr. Bowles failed to show a substantial change
in circumstances to support an adjustment to child support and had
not made reasonable efforts to locate new employment.
filed

a Notice of Appeal dated August

2, 1990, the

Mr. Bowles
Docketing

Statement was filed on August 24, 1990.
Statement of Facts
1.

After a 13 year marriage, the parties to this action

were divorced on July 6, 1987, and Respondent Janet Bowles was
awarded custody of the parties two minor children age 12 and 14 at
the time of the modification hearing.
pay child

support

Mr. Bowles was ordered to

in the amount of $326 per child per month.

(Record at 15; hereinafter R. 15).

3

2.

Mr. Bowies' child support obligation was modified

pursuant to a hearing and an Order dated February 27, 1989, where
support was adjusted to the sum of $272 per child per month from
that day forward.
3.

(R. 53).

In August, 1989, Mr. Bowles was told by his employer

Signetics Company that he would be laid off. He asked his ex-wife
for a temporary, voluntary reduction in child support pending his
finding new employment commensurate with the amount of unemployment
compensation he would be receiving.

Mrs. Bowles refused to make

any voluntary adjustment to child support.
4.

(R. 56)

In September, 1989, Mr. Bowles filed a Petition for

Modification of Decree of Divorce alleging a substantial change of
circumstances based on his lay off from employment with Signetics
Company effective September 29, 1989.
5.

(R. 56).

Mr. Bowles was employed by Signetics Company as a

construction worker from November, 1983, until September, 1989, a
total of approximately six years. (Transcript p. 6; hereinafter T.
6).

Although

Signetics

is

primarily

a

manufacturer

of

semiconductors it employed a staff of construction workers for
plant remodeling. Mr. Bowles thus received above-average wages for
construction

work,

year

round

employment

and

benefits—all

exceptional attributes for construction work which is typically
unstable, seasonal and without benefits.
4

(T. 15).

6.

At the time Mr. Bowies' was laid off he was earning

a gross monthly salary of $2,658 per month.
1.

(T. 7, Exhibit 1).

After his lay off Mr. Bowles began to receive

unemployment compensation initially for a period of 26 weeks at the
rate of $208 per week, a total of $894 gross per month.
8.

(T. 8).

At the time of his lay off Mr. Bowles met with the

Office of Recovery Services to inform them of his changed situation
and entered into a wage assignment agreement where that Office
deducted one-half of every unemployment compensation check received
by him which was paid to Respondent as child support, a total of
$412 per month.
9.

(T. 10, 63, Exhibit 1).

Prior to his employment at Signetics Mr. Bowles was

self-employed in the excavation business where he owned a back hoe
and would contract out his personal labor.

Mr. Bowles earned his

living in this manner for three years from 1981 through 1983. (T.
10, 11). Mr. Bowles testified from the parties' income tax returns
as to his earnings for these three years which average $738 per
month.

(Addendum - Chart 1)
10.

(T. 12-14).

Mr. Bowles testified that during the years 1981

through 1983 his family in fact received loans and gifts of money
from their family as his earnings were inadequate to meet basic
expenses.

(T. 14)•

5

11*

At the time of his lay off, Mr. Bowies' educational

credentials consist of a high school diploma and excavation license
(T. 11)12.

Mr. Bowles testified that his salary at Signetics

was the most he had ever earned as a construction worker and that
his beginning wage was

$9 per hour when he was hired in November,

1983 and that his ending wage was $13.42 per hour when he was laid
off*

(T. 14-15).
13.

Mr.

Bowles

testified

that

his

employment

at

Signetics was not typical of the construction industry overall as
there he received a salary and benefits and worked 12 months a year
whereas

generally

construction

work

is

lower pay, sporadic,

seasonal, and without employment benefits.
14.

Mr.

Bowles

testified

(T. 15).

that

he

began

seeking

employment before his lay off in September and met all the
requirements to receive unemployment compensation consisting of at
least two job applications per week.
15.

(T. 16, 17).

Mr. Bowles searched for construction and excavation

work and also applied for advertised jobs and those forwarded to
him by Job Service. He testified that he looked in the Provo-Orem
area as well as Salt Lake and St. George.

He named at least six

construction companies he had applied with in these areas as well

6

as efforts he made through friends in the construction industry to
find available jobs.
16.

(T. 18).

In mid-December, 1989, Mr. Bowles determined he

could not find employment in the construction industry and because
the industry itself was unstable and seasonal, that he needed to
consider

job training which would allow him more stable and

lucrative employment.

(T. 19).

He also testified that he had

depleted his financial resources (retirement and IRA's) to keep
current in his child support and make up the shortfall in his
expenses (T. 23).
17.

Mr. Bowles qualified for a State sponsored Job

Training Program through Job Service as his work for Signetics was
classified

as

an

industry

affected

by

foreign

competition

(semiconductors) which had caused his lay offs. The job retraining
program requirements provided that unemployment compensation would
be extended up to a year so long as the applicant maintained fulltime student status of at least 12 hours.
18.

(T. 9, 20).

Mr. Bowles began attending Dixie College in January,

1990, and estimated he would complete a nursing or x-ray technician
program by the Spring of 1993.

(T. 21, 43). He has maintained at

least 12 hours and a "BM average and testified he had approximately
three hours of class daily and three hours per class hour of
homework daily. (T. 59).
7

19.

Since his lay off Mr. Bowles also obtained part-time

employment at a convenience store earning approximately $60 per
week. (T. 21, 22). Thus, at the time of the hearing he was earning
$894 from unemployment compensation and $260 from part-time work
for a total of $1,154 per month.

The sum of $412 per month of

this total was being withheld as child support, leaving Mr. Bowles
$754 for his personal expenses.
20.

(T. 24-25).

Mr. Bowles testified to and

filed

a pre-trial

settlement statement reporting his personal monthly expenses to be
$1,294 per month which increases to $1,694 a month when child
support of $412 is added.

(R. 88). Mr. Bowles testified that he

had been able to maintain the expense shortfall by depleting his
retirement and IRA accounts from his employer and at the time of
hearing he had approximately $400 left from those funds,,
21.

(T. 23).

Janet Bowles testified that she had been working

full-time for Alpine School District since 1985 and at the time of
the hearing was earning $7.47 per hour for a gross monthly income
of $1,284.85.
22.

(T. 60, 62).
Mrs. Bowles testified that she had remarried and her

husband earned $2,000 a month, that her household consisted of
herself, her husband and her two children from her marriage to Mr.
Bowles and that she had just purchased a new home and ci car.
63-66)
8

(T.

23.

Mr, Bowles proffered a child support worksheet based

on the income levels produced through discovery showing child
support should be $194 total per month and proposed to the Court
that his support obligation be reduced to $200 per month until he
had graduated and was re-employed full-time.
24.

(Exhibit 8)

The trial court held that there had not been a

substantial, material change of circumstances

to justify any

adjustment to child support. The Court also commented that it did
not find that Mr. Bowies' job search efforts reasonable and that
the Court was aware that a lot of construction was going on in St.
George.

(T. 86) .
Summary of the Argument
1.

The trial court failed to find a material change in

circumstances to justify any adjustment to child support.

Mr.

Bowles had been involuntarily terminated from his employment and
his income was reduced from $2,658 per month to income at the time
of

trial

totalling

from

unemployment

$1,154 per month.

compensation
The Court's

and

part-time

work

failure to find a

substantial change of circumstances when the lay off was beyond the
control of the individual and had resulted in a drastic, permanent
loss of income is reversible error.
2.

In light of the proven loss of income earning

ability of Mr. Bowies', the Court erred in not considering his
9

changed ability to pay support and ordering a modification of
support, as required by U.C.A. §78-45-7(2)•

Regardless of whether

the Court was persuaded or not as to the reasonableness of Mr.
Bowies' re-employment efforts, his lay off was involuntary and the
Court had a duty to Order relief for some period of time or amount.
3.

Utah law requires a trial court to make specific,

detailed findings on all material issues,. The trial court herein
failed to make any findings as to Mr. Bowles' present income, his
historical income, or as to why the Court felt his search for
employment was not reasonable, in light of no contrary evidence.
4»

The trial court erred in not considering Mr. Bowies'

unrefuted testimony about the unavailability of employment after a
three month job search. Further, it was improper for the Court to
discount this testimony based on the Court's own personal opinion
that construction work was available in another city where no
evidence or testimony had been presented to that effect.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
The Court erred in not finding a material
change in circumstances to justify an
adjustment in child support.
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5 (1989), a trial
court

has

continuing

jurisdiction

to

modify

child

support

obligations and upon a request for such a modification a threshold
10
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To make no

finding that circumstances have even changed is error and an abuse
of discretion. That has been the holding in many cases before this
Court.

In the case of Christiansen v. Christiansen. 6(57 P.2d 592

(Utah 1983), the Court held that in a determination of a change of
circumstances justifying support modification, it is proper to
consider

changes

in

the

parent's

ability

to

pay

support.

Similarly, in the case of Reick v. Reick, 652 P.2d 916 (Utah 1982),
the Court affirmed that changes in the parties' incomes can
constitute

a

material

change

of

circumstances

modification of child support obligations.

justifying

See also, Maughn v.

Mauqhn. 770 P.2d 156 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989).
In review of this record, this Court must find that the
Trial Court's finding of no change of circumstances is in fact
clearly erroneous and reverse this finding.

Mr. Bowlegs' lay off

was a fact clearly beyond his control or ability to influence. It
is manifest injustice not to find that this lay off was a sudden,
adverse and material change in his circumstances that directly
affected his ability to pay child support and justify relief from
the ongoing support order.

Regardless of whether the Trial Court

was persuaded as to the reasonableness of Mr. Bowles' job search
efforts after his termination, there can be no question but that
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Ct. App. 1988), Durfee v. Durfee, 140 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 42 (August 9,
1990; Ct. App.). This Court has often reversed decisions where the
trial Court has failed to make detailed findings of fact and
conclusions of law necessary for consideration by a reviewing
court. Stephens v. Stephens, 754 P.2d 1952 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988).
In the present case, no findings were made by Judge
Christensen in this case on the ability of Mr Bowles to pay the
former child support amount of $427 a month in his unemployed
condition of reduced income.

The Court gave no consideration to

the changes in Mr. Bowies' income from $2,658 gross per month with
Signetics to the level he was earning at the time of the hearing
from unemployment compensation of $864 gross per month, plus parttime earnings of $260 for a total of $1,124 gross per month. From
this, $412 was automatically withheld for on-going support leaving
him with $724 for his own expenses.
consideration
available

to the

financial

fact

The Court also gave no

that Mr. Bowles

resources

consisting

had
of

expended

his

all

retirement

distribution and IRA funds to satisfy his Court ordered obligations
and expenses leaving him only with earned income to pay ongoing
child support. Additionally, the Court ignored the facts that Mr.
Bowles was current in support until his lay off and that no
hardship situation existed with Mrs. Bowles who had a household
income of $3,284 gross per month for a family of four which does
14
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t e s t i f i e d that Sign€5tics w a s a unique and superior' c o n s t r u c t i o n job

as it was primarily a manufacturer of semiconductors with only
secondary and limited construction needs.

It was thus a major

employer which provided full benefits, full-time employment and
excellent

wages,

whereas

typical

construction

work

in

his

experience lasted from six to eight months in a given year, was
sporadic, seasonal, not as well paid and provided no job benefits.
(T. 15).

Having no future employment prospects with Signetics,

the Court can only consider Mr. Bowies' historic earnings in usual
construction

work

before

Signetics,

or

prevailing

community

standards as a relevant basis for imputing income under U.C.A. §7845-7.5(7).
Mr. Bowles testified that prior to Signetics he was selfemployed in excavation work for three years from 1981 through 1983.
The tax returns from those years were introduced as Exhibit 2 and
in Addendum Chart 1 to this brief, Mr. Bowles has set forth the
relevant income data from those tax returns. That Chart shows the
gross receipts from each year, less business expenses with the
adjustment that any depreciation has been added back in as a noncash expense which is not usually deducted for child support
purposes* The three years outlined confirmed Mr. Bowies' testimony
that

typically

the

construction

business

is

sporadic

and

unpredictable as his first year in business he had a net profit of
$3,684, his second year it was $20,054 and his third year it was
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machine for $20/hour but had never informed Mr. Bowles of this
offer.

(T. 46, 72, 73).

Mr. Bowles also testified he had a

brother-in-law in the excavation business who did not feel leasing
the equipment in the St. George area was viable.

(T. 58). Also,

Mr- Bowles testified he had no time to operate the machine while he
worked for Signetics or attended school and that it was to be sold
by Court Order in November, 1990. (T. 55-58). Again, however, the
Court makes no conclusion or actual "finding" from this comment as
to whether that level of income should be imputed to Mr. Bowles for
child support purposes.
Notwithstanding this argument, the earning potential from
the back hoe is irrelevant as the parties' Decree of Divorce, as
modified, ordered that it be sold by November, 1990, and the
proceeds divided equally between the parties.
This sale has been completed

(R. 54) (T. 55,57).

and the back hoe is no longer

available for use by either party.
POINT III
The Court erred in failing to
Appellant's evidence of his efforts
employment and in erroneously taking
notice of disputed facts outside the

consider
to find
judicial
record.

Mr. Bowles testified that he was first aware that he
would be laid off in August, 1989, and that he began his job search
at that time.

(T. 17). His search began with Job Service where he

obtained unemployment compensation benefits and was required to
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expenses were $1,200 plus $412 in support on an income of $1,124.
Mrs.* Bowles had also refused his offer to temporarily adjust
support until he was re-employed.

The question thus becomes in

these circumstances how long is it reasonable for Mr. Bowles to
have waited to find construction employment?
make

a

decision

and

determined

that

he

Mr. Bowles had to
could

not

survive

financially through a prolonged period of unemployment and that
prospects in the construction industry even if he found work were
likely to remain unstable with sporadic work.
it was

not

unreasonable

to take

advantage

Mr. Bowles submits
of a

unique

job

retraining opportunity to learn basic new skills in a profession
with long term stability and overall better benefits and pay.
Importantly, the job training also promised a continued income to
Mr» Bowles for at least a year so reasonable child support could
still be paid.

Eventually, Mrs. Bowles and the parties' two

children will also benefit from Mr. Bowles7 retraining and the
permanent career change with higher future child support.
The Court's comment on Mr. Bowies' job search was simply
that

"there is no evidence to the Court that he has made a

reasonable effort in the view of the Court" (T. 87).

No other

findings or rationale is provided to support this view. The Court
also stated that "it appears to the Court that [St. George] is a
moving construction area" (T. 87). Mr. Bowles submits that this
20
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on such unreliable speculation.
Mr. Bowles' employment at Signetics Company was a one-of-

above-average wages.

When he was laid off from that position, I lis

income earni ng ability was serious I ;;r ai :;t ::I permanent] y dimi nish EIJCJ ,,

jobs which ai e traditiona 11 y seasona] ai :t ill i 11 istab 1 e . 01 i that basis
the Court had a duty to find that a substanti a] , material change of

to support

1 11 : , Bowles presented evidence of both a , ::: 't n n s „] and

historic earnings which were unrefuted yet totally i gnored by tl ie
2 111

Court.

It was clearly an abuse of discretion to ignore this

evidence and refuse to make any adjustment to support in light of
Mr. Bowles' involuntary lay off, his good faith job search in a
depressed industry and his reasonable decision to accept a job
training opportunity which provided him income and excellent future
career prospects which will benefit all concerned.
Conclusion
Based on the evidence and testimony the Trial Court had
a duty to do the following:

first, to find that a material,

substantial change in circumstances had occurred based on Mr.
Bowles' involuntary

lay off; second, to review the required

statutory factors on adjusting child support which include a review
of Mr. Bowles' earning ability; third, to adjust Mr. Bowles' child
support based on either his actual income where he was earning
$1,124 per month at the time of the hearing, or on an imputed
income

basis

according

to

§78-45-7.5(5)(c)

using

his

actual

historic earnings in typical construction as a basis for imputing
income at the level of $738 gross per month.

There was no

justification in the record for the Court to make no change
whatsoever to the Plaintiff's level of child support based on his
involuntary termination and this Court should reverse the Trial
Court's ruling and find that an adjustment of child support to $200
per month should have been made effective with Mr. Bowles' date of
22
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SUZANN^ MARELIUS"f
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
I

Chart 1 - Summary of Appellant's Earnings
from Excavation Work 1981 - 1983

II

Transcript excerpt containing the Ruling of
the Court. (T. 86-93).

III

U.C.A. §78-45-7(2)
U.C.A. §78-45-7.5
U.C.A. §30-3-5
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CHART 1
SUMMARY OF TRIAL EXHIBIT 2
INCOME TAX RETURNS SHOWING INCOME FROM
EXCAVATION WORK

1981 -

Gross Receipts
Business Expenses

$13,666
9.981

(Schedule
C
No
depreciation listed as no
equipment was owned)

1982

$

Gross Receipts
Business Expenses

$36,383
16.690

(Schedule
Depreciation of
added back in)

1983 -

3,684
307

Net Profit
Gross Monthly Amount

C
$3,,364

Net Profit
Gross Monthly Amount

20,054
$ 1,670

Gross Receipts
Business Expenses

$15,438
12.592

(Schedule
Depreciation of
added back in)

C
$4,r934

Net Profit
Gross Monthly Amount.

$

2,846
237

Summary - Three Year Period 1981 to 1983
Total Income - $26,584
Average Annual Income - $8,861
Average Monthly Income - $738

1 • expenses.

And there's a large sum of money that's tied up

in the equity of that home.

2
3 |

Mrs. Bacon wishes to have access to her share of

4

that equity.

5

to keep that in the family, the home can be appraised with a

6

fair market value and Mr. Bowles can buy Mrs. Bacon's equity

If Mr. Bowles feels that it's necessary for him!

!

7 | out of it.

But she has a right to have her equity out of

8 i that home.

The home cannot be divided, actually, partitioned.!

9 J And therefore the Court should order that it be sold and the ]
10

equity divided between the parties.

11 I

Thank you.

12 |

THE COURT:

Well, counsel, addressing

13 J the issues that have been reserved in the pre-trial order.
14 I

First of all child support.
Court about Mr. Bowles1 position.

15

16 : lost his job.
17

Two things concern the

No question but what he

The thing the Court is concerned about, though,)

the effort that he's making to gain employment to supplement

18 I that, his schooling.
19 !

Now, the Court's only testimony, that I have before!

20 I me, as I recall it:
21

The efforts to get employment have been j

made in this area or in the Salt Lake area.

22 j board a couple of times in St. George.

He checked the

But by his own testi-

23 ; mony, it appears to the Court that that is a moving construe-j
i

24 j tion area.

It would be whether he is occupying the seat on a

25 j backhoe or working in some other capacity on a construction

86

job.

The testimony is he 1nas the abil ity to do that.

,

I f m not satisfie<i that he T s made an effort to
employ himself, as he fully might under the circumstances, in
getting employment in that operation.

It may be that the

backhoe itself may not be 1^he instrument by which he can
improve his position .

i

But there r s no evidence to the Court

!

that he rs made a reasonable effort, in the view of the Court, |
to obtain employment in the field in which he is obviously
skilled and capable of doing.
In looking at the potential of that backhoe, I
recognize that the only years here in which he made substantial]
income was 1981-1982, he made about $1,400 a month.

Consider-'

ing, though, that he had a substantial amount of expense
deduction by depreciation, which the Court does not believe
to be a legitimate deduction from the standpoint of determining what his disposable income would be.

1983, $2,088 loss.

As I recall, the depreciation that was claimed that year far '•
exceeded that amount.

He's got that backhoe up on the job.

No expense to him, or no income to him.

Testimony is that

it could be leased for at least $20 an hour, 20 or 30 hours
a week.

That appears to the Court to be $2,400.
But even conservatively taking it, it will be

23 j $1,200 a month that the Court feels could be generated from
1
the use of that machine.
I have difficulty in determining
24 I
25 |1 what the implication of income, however, should be under the

87

!
!
|

1 j circumstances, since he hasn't really worked on that job.
2 j

But it does appear to the Court, in the statute,

3 j where there is no recent work history on which the Court
i

I

4 j could rely, that the Court can consider that a 40-hour minimun|
5

wage is within the potential of this defendant.

I'm not

6

satisfied that one assumes his responsibility in going to

7 j school after a day, I think it's common knowledge, many people)
8 j go who work full time, hold down a full time job, carry a
9

full load; that that isn't unreasonable to expect that one

10 j do, particularly where one has a family to support.
11 J
12

So the Court doesn't believe that the evidence
supports a justification at this point to reduce child sup-

13 j port. And the Court is going to deny the petition to modify,
on the basis that I've indicated. And I don't think the
14
15

defendant is making a legitimate effort to obtain employment,

16

I don't think he's making a legitimate effort to rent that

17

machine or to use it in a productive way, that would be pro-

18

ductive of income.

19

believe that I can legitimately find a material change in

20

circumstances that would justify the Court in reducing the

21

obligation for child support at this time.

And for that reason, the Court does not

Now with respect to visitation.

22

It appears that

the Order of the Court has heretofore been provided, as late

23

24 i as February 27, 1989.

I see no material change in the circum-j

25 I stances of the parties which would justify the Court in making
•

•

.

...

.

—

_

_

_

.

„
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.

1 ; a change in that Order; except to indicate that:
Certainly, the plaintiff doesnft have any right to,

2!

3 j in my view, to a visitation during those extended periods of
visitation when the defendant has the children during the
summer months.

Certainly, this visitation schedule must have

taken into account the age of the children, the expectations
I
t

7

of visitation.

So that the Court does not believe that there

can be any material change that would change that.
It -- about telephone calls, as I see in here.
But that ought to be, Mrs. Bacon, is something that you ought
to recognize and give this man a chance to have every reasonable visitation with his children.

The more you encourage

their love for him and his love to them, the better it's
going to be for you.

One thing about love, the more you

give, the more you permit, the more there is.
upon itself or deplete itself.

It isn't eat

And if each of you will recog-j

nize that to the extent that you build the other up in the
eyes of your children,

you are going to enhance your own.

status with those children.
So the Court does believe that he ought to be permitted to telephone these children, have them telephone him.
If it's a long distance call, that may be something else,
I don't know that the plaintiff ought to assume the expense
for that.

But certainly he ought to be able to, during

reasonable times of the day, communicate with his children
89

during, over the telephone.
As far as the tax exemption is concerned.

The law,

Federal law provided that that tax exemption be claimed by
the person having paramount custody of the children.

That

does not mean, however, the Court cannot under proper circumstances order that a custodial parent sign the necessary
waivers or documentation to permit the non-custodial parent
to have the one or more of the children as dependents.
However, in this case, since the defendant is unemployed, doesn't have anytrhing, it doesn't appear to the
Court that at this time that the appropriate thing for the
Court to do is to order that.

So the Court declines to make

an order directing the plaintiff, to order that she sign
waivers and permit the defendant to claim either of these
children as dependents for tax purposes.
And when the defendant does become productive of
income, as I think he?s capable of doing, that may be an
appropriate time to consider whether or not he ought to be
entitled to claim an exception for such purpose.
Well, with respect to the home in Nephi.

These

parties are co-tenants, and said "joint-tenants," I thought
I read in the file that they were "tenants in common.11
MR. CHUNTZ:
24 j
25 |

I believe I mis-spoke myself,

y o u r Honor.
THE COURT:

E i t h e r way, t h a t

doesn't
90

1 I determine what ought to be done.

The law doesn't require

2 1 co-tenants to remain such if one of them doesn't want to be.
i

I think the expectation is that this property be sold.

And

since these parties are having financial difficulties, it!s
obvious to the Court that that is one solution that may help
alleviate some of the problems that exist.
So the Court doesn't have any information as to
how the rental income compares with the mortgage payment and I
the expenses of upkeep.

But the Court is going to Order in

that case, No. 6527, that that property be sold, put on the
market; that either can list the property for sale.
If the listing institution requires that both signa-j
tures appear, the Court is going to Order that both of you
sign a listing agreement.

If there's a dispute as to the

amount at which it ought to be listed, you've got a figure
of some, what is it, about $36,000, which may or may not be
accurate at this time, since that was a 1986 appraisal.

It

may be that you'll have to get an appraisal and listed at
some appropriate amount, and either offer it for sale at that
amount or, if one or the other of the parties wants to buy
out the other, it ought to be permitted, it seems to the
Court.
Maybe Mr. Bowles would like to do that, since it
did initially come as a gift from his parents to these two
parties.
91

The expenses of sale, commissions, if any, payment
of the existing mortgage, all ought to come off of the sale
proceeds before those matters are disbursed.
And if either party obtains a legitimate offer,
there's a dispute as to that, then the Court would have to
hear evidence and to take testimony, I suppose, as to whether
or not to require one or the other to accept such a sale, if
that becomes a matter in dispute.
Ifm going to direct that you prep an order, finding^
of fact, conclusions of law, consistent with what Ifve ruled
here today, Mr. Chuntz.

Forward those to counsel for the

defendant, for her approval as to form.

If they are not

approved with a statutory time, then you may submit them to
the Court for signature; or she may of course file her objections to the order is it may be submitted, if she has any.
Mr. Bowles, I think you have the ability and the
means to do more than you are doing.

And that's the basis

that the Court is making the ruling that I am today.

If .you

legitimately cannot get work in an area where you've indicated
and I think where the Court can take judicial notice of the
fact that there's a lot of construction, a lot of work going
on, that: you need to do it.
j

You can't just sit back for a

couple cof years while thisse children are jgrowing up <and then

1 hope to improve yourself andi get a better job,

That !s laud-

i
ible, I understand that, it' s certainly a lot better to be in

92

1 . a stable industry than it is to be in one in which you are
2 j beset by weather.

But in the meantime, these children have a

j

3 j right to be supported.

They have a right to, for your con-

4 !

tribution toward that effort.

And it needs to be a reasonably

5 I

and legitimate effort on your part.

If you cannot and you've

6 | made an effort of that nature, the Court doesn't feel that yoif
7 !

have, at this juncture, then sometime in the future the Court

8 j may be in a position to consider it further.
9 j
10!

So, I appreciate your input, counsel.

And, we'll

be in recess.

11 I
12 |
13 |

(WHEREUPON, the Court stood in recess at 4:35
o'clock p.m.)
. . .

14 !
I

15 I
16 !

17

i

18 |
[

19 j
20 !
!

21 ,
J

22 |
i
23 i
!

24
25 i
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REPORTER' S CERTIFICATE
I, EDWARD V. QUIST, hereby certify that
I am an official court reporter for the above-entitled Court, 1
duly registered and licensed to practice in the State of
Utah; that on the 19th day of June, 1990, I appeared before
the above-named Court and rep orted the proceedings had and
testimony given in the above- entitled cause of action; that
the foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 93, inclusive, contain
a true and accurate transcrip t of ny stenographic notes,
as taken in the above-entitle d hearing, to the best of my
ability.
Dated at Provo, Utah this 2nd day of
November, 1990.

1

...—

Edward V. Quist, "CSK
License No. 71
310 County Courthouse
51 South University
Provo, Utah 84601
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UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT

78-45-7

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Jefferies v. JefTeries. 752 P.2d 909
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Asper v. Asper, 753 P.2d
978 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

78-45-3. Duty of man.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 253 (Utah
1987).

78-45-7. Determination of amount of support — Rebuttable guidelines.
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by pirior court
order unless there has been a material change of circumstance on the part of
the obligor or obligee.
(2) If no prior court order exists, or a material change in circumstances has
occurred, the court determining the amount of prospective suppon: shall require each party to file a proposed award of child support using the guidelines
before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing award may
be granted.
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court
shall establish support after considering all relevant factors including but not
limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
(f) the ages of the parties:
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support of others.
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess
all arrearages based upon, but not limited to:
(a) the amount of public assistance received by the obligee, if any; and
(b) the funds that have been reasonably and necessarily expended in
support of spouse and children.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 7: 1977. ch.
145, § 10; 1984, ch. 13, § 2; 1989, ch. 214. § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, divided former
Subsection (2) into present Subsections <2) and
'3) by substituting the language beginning require each party" at the end of Subsection (2)
and the introductory language in Subsection
t3) for "consider all relevant factors including

but not limited to:"; rewrote Subsection (3)(e),
which had read, "the need of the obligee"; substituted "ages" for "age" in Subsection (3)(f);
redesignated former Subsection (3) as Subsection (4): deleted former Subsection (4), providing for the establishment and use of a uniform
statewide assessment formula: and made
minor stylistic changes.
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DIVORCE

30-3-5

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health
care of parties and children — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation —
Termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, and parties. The court shall
include the following in every decree of divorce:
fa) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; and
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental
care insurance for the dependent children.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the non-custodial parent to provide
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the property as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
relatives, the court shall consider the welfare of the child.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his
rights are determined.
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions
of a court order is made and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay
the reasonable attorneys fees expended by the prevailing party in that action,
if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted in
good faith.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212: L.
1909. ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917. § 3000: R.S.
1933 & C. 1943. 40-3-5: L. 1969. ch. 72, § 3;
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979. ch. 110, $ 1; 1984, ch.
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72. § 1; 1985. ch. 100, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment by Chapter 72 rewrote Subsection <1):

added Subsection (2); designated two undesignated paragraphs as Subsections i3) and (4);
inserted "In determining" and "the court" in
Subsection 14); redesignated former Subsections (2) and (3) as Subsections (5) and (6); divided Subsection i5) into two sentences, substituting ff However, if the remarriage" for "unless
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78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted gross income used.
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each parent's share of.
the child support award. Only income of the natural or adoptive parents of this
child may be used to determine the award under these guidelines.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.4, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 6.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214

became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed income.
(1) As used in the guidelines ''gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources,
except under Subsection (3); and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents,
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest,
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains,
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from
"nonmeans-tested" government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one
full-time job.
'3) Specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC);
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance: and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross
receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the
amount of business income determined for tax purposes.
'5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable documentation of current earnings, including year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements. Each parent shall supplement documentation of current earnings with copies of
tax returns from at least the most recent year to provide verification of
earnings over time and shall document income from nonearned sources
according to the source.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
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(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection
(7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
(b) Income shall be imputed to a parent based upon employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in
the community.
<a If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at
least at the federal minimum wage for a forty-hour work week. To impute
a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as
to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
'd) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can
earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he
cannot earn minimum wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills: or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the
custodial parent's presence in the home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the
subject of a child support award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own
right, such as Supplemental Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered
as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case.
Historv: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L.
1989. chi 214, § 7.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989. Chapter 214

became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45-7.6. Adjusted gross income.
{1) As used in the guidelines, ''adjusted gross income" is the amount calculated by subtracting from gross income alimony previously ordered and paid
and child support previously ordered.
12) The guidelines do not reduce the total child support award by adjusting
the gross incomes of the parents for alimony ordered in the pending proceeding. In establishing alimony, the court shall consider that in determining the
child support, the guidelines do not provide a deduction from gross income for
alimony.
Historv: C. 1953. 78-45-7.6, enacted by L.
1989. ch! 214. $ 8.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989. Chapter 214

became effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to
Utah Const.. Art. VI. Sec. 25.
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